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Abstract
The theory of strategic managerial delegation has recently been extended by incor-
porating bargaining over managerial contracts (van Witteloostuijn et.al 2007, etc).
Assuming that bargaining involves only the incentive rates of managers, this line of
research has shown that market outcomes (profits and social welfare) depend cru-
cially on the intra-firm allocation of bargaining powers. In the current paper we
revisit the bargaining framework assuming that negotiations involve all contractual
terms (incentive rates and transfers). We show that contrary to the earlier results,
the market equilibrium is independent of bargaining powers, the latter determining
only the transfers. Hence the outcome of our model is identical to the outcome of the
delegation model with no bargaining.
Keywords: Strategic delegation; oligopoly; Nash bargaining; equivalence
JEL Classification: L13, L21.
1 Introduction
Strategic managerial delegation is an important branch of modern industrial economics.
The relevant literature was launched with the seminal papers of Vickers (1985), Fershtman
& Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987). These works postulated that the production and pricing
decisions of firms are taken by their managers, the incentives of which are strategically
distorted by the owners of firms. The distortion materializes via the terms of the contracts
that the owners offer to managers. The signing of contracts is a credible device for inducing
the managers to behave ”aggressively” in the market and to enhance the profits of their
firms.
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The analysis of strategic delegation in oligopoly is based on two-stage games of the
following form: in the first stage, firms’ owners choose the terms of the managerial contracts.
These terms essentially determine the objective function of each firm. In the second stage,
managers select their market strategies (quantities or prices), based on the outcome of the
first stage.
The literature has examined various types of managerial contracts. The most frequently
encountered are the sales-based contracts, where the manager’s reward is a function of his
firm’s profit and output (Vickers 1985) or profit and revenue (Fershtman & Judd 1987,
Sklivas 1987), the relative performance contracts, where the reward depends on the differ-
ence between own firm’s profit and the opponent firm’s profit (Salas Fumas 1992) and the
market share contracts, where the reward depends on own firm’s profit and market share
(Jansen et.al 2007).
These works spurred a large number of extensions. The basic delegation model was
enriched via the incorporation of R&D (Zhang and Zhang 1997, Kopel and Riegler 2009),
quality competition (Ishibashi 2001), collusion (Lambertini and Trombetta 2002, Pal 2010),
mixed oligopoly (White 2001), mergers (Krakel and Sliwka 2006, Ziss 2001), patent licensing
(Saracho 2002), wage bargaining (Szymanski 1994), endogenous mode of market competi-
tion (Miller and Pazgal 2001), two-period models (Mujumdar and Pal 2007), Stackelberg
competition (Kopel and Loﬄer 2008), etc.
The literature described above was built on the assumption that the owners of firms
have the power to impose their terms on the contracts they sign with their managers.
Recently, van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007) pioneered a line of research where (some of) the
terms of the managerial contracts are bargained over by owners and managers. Negotiations
are modeled via a Nash bargaining game within each firm. Agents are characterized by
their bargaining powers, which they are assumed to be exogenous. Bargaining deals with
the incentive rate of managers, i.e., the parameter that determines their market behavior.
The other terms of the contract, i.e, transfers to the managers, are not included in the
bargaining agenda.
Using the above framework, van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007) shows that bargaining
plays a role: incentive rates, and thus quantities, prices and profits, depend crucially on
the allocation of bargaining powers. In particular, if the bargaining power of managers
increases, profits fall (increase) provided that sales-based (relative performance) contracts
are used. The opposite is true for social welfare. Van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007) focused
on a homogeneous Cournot market. Their work was subsequently extended to include mar-
kets with differentiated goods and Bertrand competition (Nakamura 2008a), non-constant
returns to scale (Nakamura 2008b), sequential competition (Kamaga & Nakamura 2008)
and international oligopolies (Nakamura 2011). These works show, again, that bargaining
affects the market outcome.
The current note revisits the bargaining framework by assuming that all contractual
terms (i.e., incentive rates and transfers) are bargained over by owners and managers. We
show that this framework produces a completely different result compared to the earlier
works on bargaining: incentive rates, and hence market equilibrium outcomes, are com-
pletely independent of the allocation of bargaining powers. Bargaining affects only the
intra-firm transfers (which have no impact on market equilibrium). Since the market out-
come does not depend on bargaining powers, it is identical to the outcome of the seminal
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delegation model where the owners fully impose their terms on the contracts (Vickers 1985,
Fershtman & Judd 1987, Sklivas 1987). This equivalence holds for all known types of man-
agerial contracts. It holds also irrespective of the demand and cost structure of firms, the
number of competitors, the mode (Cournot or Bertrand) and timing of market competition
(simultaneous or sequential choice of strategies).
The reason why the early works on bargaining deliver results under which bargaining
does play role is the fact that their bargaining games neglect intra-firm transfers. The role
of transfers is to align the interests of owners and managers, in the sense that both parties
inside each firm are interested in pure profit maximization (as in the seminal delegation
model). The justification for not taking into account the full contract is that the managerial
reward is simply set equal to the opportunity cost of the manager.1 Although such an
assumption is plausible when the manager has no bargaining power, it is less plausible
when dealing with a bargaining framework where both parties have positive bargaining
power.
In what follows, we present the model and the analysis in section 2. Section 3 discusses
extensions of the main results and section 4 provides brief concluding remarks.
2 Results
Consider a duopolistic market with firms 1 and 2. The price and quantity of firm i are pi
and qi respectively; its cost function is given by Ci(qi); its profit function is pii = piqi−Ci(qi),
i = 1, 2. Our framework is general enough so that we do not need to specify the mode
of market competition (i.e., whether firms compete by selecting prices or quantities). The
mode of competition is thus assumed to be fixed without being specified. Our formulation
allows also for either homogeneous or differentiated goods.
Firms are characterized by ownership-management separation. The manager of each
firm is assigned the task of choosing his firm’s market price or quantity by maximizing an
objective (or incentive) function. Some well known examples of this function are based
on the profit-quantity or profit-revenue schemes (Vickers 1985, Fershtman & Judd 1987,
Sklivas 1987), the relative performance scheme (Salas Fumas 1992) or the market share
scheme (Jansen et.al 2007).
Under the first two schemes, the manager of firm i is delegated the objective function
vi = pii + aiqi or vi = aipii + (1 − ai)piqi; under the third, the objective function is vi =
pii− aipij; and under the last scheme, the objective function is vi = pii + ai qi
Q
, where ai ≥ 0
is manager i’s incentive rate and Q = q1 + q2. The total compensation that the manager
receives is yi = λivi + ti, where λi and ti are constants. The manager’s utility function and
reservation utility respectively are wi(yi) and w¯i. We assume that wi is increasing in yi,
i = 1, 2.
The seminal approach in the literature has assumed that the owners of firms impose
their own terms in the managerial contracts. I.e., ai is chosen via the maximization of firm
i’s profit function.2 On the other hand, the values of λi and ti are chosen so as to equate
1See for example Nakamura (2011).
2Witteloostuijn et al. (2007), Nakamura (2008a, 2008b, 2011) and Kamaga & Nakamura (2008) are
exceptions. We elaborate more on these works later on.
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the manager’s utility to his reservation utility (the values of λi and ti do not affect the
market decisions of firm i’s manager).
In the current note we assume that the incentive rate ai and the terms λi and ti are
determined via a Nash bargaining game inside firm i, i = 1, 2. The timing of the interaction
is as follows: in stage 1, the owners and manager of firm i bargain over the triplet (ai, λi, ti),
i = 1, 2. Bargaining is simultaneous across firms. The bargaining outcomes become com-
monly known. In stage 2, the two managers choose quantities (if market competition is of
the Cournot type) or prices (if market competition is of the Bertrand type). We call this
game G (irrespective of the mode of competition); and we call G− the game with the same
time structure but without bargaining (i.e, the game where the terms of the managerial
contracts are chosen by the firms’ owners).
Assume that the manager of firm i has been delegated the objective function vi, i = 1, 2.
We do not need to specify the exact form of vi: the result that we derive below does not
depend on the exact type of the contract. We only assume that vi is such that the game
of quantity or price competition has a unique interior solution. By backwards induction,
let us first turn to stage 2 of G where the manager of firm i solves the problem3 max
si
vi,
i = 1, 2, where si denotes either qi (if market competition is of the Cournot type) or pi (if
market competition is of the Bertrand type). Let si(a) denote his choice, where a = (a1, a2).
Let vi(a) and pii(a) denote the corresponding values of the objective and profit functions.
Denote by βi ∈ (0, 1) the bargaining power of firm i’s owners. The Nash product within
firm i in stage 1 of G is4
Bi = [pii(a)− yi]βi [wi(yi)− w¯i]1−βi , i = 1, 2 (1)
The optimization problems in stage 1 are
max
ti,λi,ai
Bi, i = 1, 2
We have the following result.
Proposition 1 The incentive rates ai, i = 1, 2, and the market equilibrium outcomes in G
and G− are identical.
Proof The first-order condition for the optimal ti, i = 1, 2, is given by
∂Bi
∂ti
= 0⇔ ti = pii(a)− λivi(a)− βi
(1− βi)∂wi(yi)∂yi
(wi(yi)− w¯i) (2)
where we used the relation
∂wi(yi)
∂ti
=
∂wi(yi)
∂yi
· ∂yi
∂ti
=
∂wi(yi)
∂yi
.
The optimality condition for λi reads as
∂Bi
∂λi
= 0⇔ λi = pii(a)− ti
vi(a)
− βi(wi(yi)− w¯i)
(1− βi)∂wi(yi)∂yi vi(a)
(3)
3The manager faces the same maximization problem in G−.
4For notational simplicity we drop the symbol a from yi(= λivi(a) + ti).
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where we used
∂wi(yi)
∂λi
=
∂wi(yi)
∂yi
· ∂yi
∂λi
=
∂wi(yi)
∂yi
vi(a).
By substituting (2) in (3), we can see that the latter holds for all λi. Hence there is a
continuum of optimal values of λi and ti. This does not pose a restriction, though, as
market prices and quantities do not depend on λi or ti.
On the other hand, we have
∂Bi
∂ai
T 0⇔ βi(wi(yi)− w¯i)(∂pii(a)
∂ai
− λi∂vi(a)
∂ai
)+
(1− βi)(pii(a)− λivi(a)− ti)∂wi(yi)
∂yi
∂yi
∂ai
T 0 (4)
Notice by (2) that
pii(a)− λivi(a)− ti = βi
(1− βi)∂wi(yi)∂yi
(wi(yi)− w¯i) (5)
Using (5) into (4), we get
∂Bi
∂ai
T 0⇔ (wi(yi)− w¯i)βi(∂pii(a)
∂ai
− λi∂vi(a)
∂ai
+
∂wi(yi)
∂yi
∂yi
∂ai
∂wi(yi)
∂yi
) T 0 (6)
However,
∂yi
∂ai
= λi
∂vi(a)
∂ai
(7)
Combining (6) and (7), we have that
∂Bi
∂ai
T 0 iff (wi(yi)− w¯i)βi∂pii(a)
∂ai
T 0. Clearly, in any
solution we must have wi(yi)− w¯i > 0. Therefore, ∂Bi
∂ai
T 0 iff ∂pii(a)
∂ai
T 0.
Hence the optimal value of ai in G is derived by solving the problem as in G−. Since ai
(i = 1, 2) is the same in G and G−, so are the corresponding market quantities and prices.
The result of Proposition 1 is driven by the existence of the intra-firm transfers ti and λi.
Under the Nash bargaining solution, the transfers guarantee that what actually matters
is the value that the firm creates, i.e, its profit. In other words, the transfers align the
interests of the two parties towards pure profit maximization. Hence both are interested
in choosing an incentive rate so as pii(a) is maximized, similarly to the no-bargaining case.
The only differences between G and G− are the values of ti and λi : in G they are no longer
set at the level that equates wi(.) to w¯i, i = 1, 2.
The bargaining agenda in the works of Witteloostuijn et al. (2007), Nakamura (2008a,
2008b, 2011) and Kamaga & Nakamura (2008) includes only the incentive rates ai, i = 1, 2.
The terms ti and λi, i = 1, 2, are not included in the agenda or even in the Nash product.
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As a result, the coordination of the interests of the two parties inside each firm is not fully
achieved. Hence, there is room for bargaining to play a role: the allocation of bargaining
power affects the incentive rates and subsequently affects the market equilibrium outcome
(unlike what happens in a full-fledged bargaining model).
3 Discussion
Our analysis has assumed a duopoly market. However, our point holds also for markets
with any number of firms (the proof of Proposition 1 would go through.) It also holds for
markets where managers select their strategies (prices or quantities) sequentially or for the
case where bargaining takes places sequentially. In what follows, we provide a short proof
for the latter game [with the understanding that a similar procedure will work for the game
of sequential market (price or quantity) competition].
Consider the following three-stage game: in the first stage, the owners and manager
of (say) firm 1 bargain over the terms of the managerial contract. The outcome becomes
commonly known. In the second stage, the owners and manager of firm 2 bargain too
over their contractual relation. Then, in the last stage the managers of the two firms
select simultaneously the market strategies of their firms (either quantities or prices). We
denote this game by G∗, whereas the corresponding game where no bargaining takes place
is denoted by G∗−.
Corollary 1 The incentive rates ai, i = 1, 2, and the market equilibrium outcomes in G
∗
and G∗− are identical.
Proof Clearly, the outcome of the last stage of G∗ is as in G. Let us next move back to
the second stage. We can apply Proposition 1 and directly conclude that the bargained
incentive rate of firm 2’s manager is identical to the incentive rate that maximizes firm 2’
profit. Denote this choice by a2(a1). Furthermore, a continuum of solutions in λ2 and t2
will arise again. Consider next the first stage of G∗. Let v1(a1, a2(a1)) and pi1(a1, a2(a1))
denote the corresponding objective and profit functions for firm 1; and with a slight abuse
of notation, let y1 denote again the compensation of its manager. The Nash product within
firm 1 is
B1 = [pi1(a1, a2(a1))− y1]β1 [w1(y1)− w¯1]1−β1 (8)
By straightforward calculations, the optimal t1 and λ1 are given by expressions similar to
(2) and (3), i.e.,
t1 = pi1(a1, a2(a1))− λ1v1(a1, a2(a1))− β1
(1− β1)∂w1(y1)∂y1
(w1(y1)− w¯1) (9)
and
λ1 =
pi1(a1, a2(a1))− t1
v1(a1, a2(a1))
− β1(w1(y1)− w¯1)
(1− β1)∂w1(y1)∂y1 v1(a1, a2(a1))
(10)
Hence again we reach to a continuum of solutions in λ1 and t1. Moreover,
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∂B1
∂a1
T 0⇔ β1(w1(y1)− w¯1)(dpi1(a1, a2(a1))
da1
− λ1dv1(a1, a2(a1))
da1
)+
(1− β1)(pi1(a1, a2(a1))− λ1v1(a1, a2(a1))− t1)∂w1(y1)
∂y1
dy1
da1
T 0 (11)
where
dpi1(a1, a2(a1))
da1
=
∂pi1(a1, a2(a1))
∂a1
+
∂pi1(a1, a2(a1))
∂a2
· ∂a2(a1)
∂a1
and likewise for
dv1(a1, a2(a1))
da1
and
dy1
da1
. Using (9) in (11) and taking into account the
relation
dy1
da1
= λ1
dv1(a1, a2(a1))
da1
we can easily reach to the conclusion that
∂B1
∂a1
T 0 iff dpi1(a1, a2(a1))
da1
T 0. Hence, a1 is
chosen by maximizing firm 1’s profit, as in G∗−.
Examples
1. Consider a market where firms produce homogeneous goods and compete in quantities.
The price in the market is given by p = a − q1 − q2; firms produce with 0 per-unit cost.
The manager of firm i is assigned the objective function vi = pii+aiqi. His compensation is
yi = λivi, i.e., we assume that ti = 0; his utility and reservation utility are wi(yi) = yi and
w¯i = 0, i = 1, 2. Bargaining across firms is simultaneous and so is quantity competition.
By straightforward calculations, we derive the profit and objective functions pii(a) =
(1− ai − aj)(1 + 2ai − aj)/9 and vi(a) = (1 + 2ai − aj)2/9. For i = 1, 2, the Nash product
within firm i is
Bi = 1
9
[(1 + 2ai − aj)[(1− λi)(1− aj)− ai(1 + 2λi)]]βi [λi(1 + 2ai − aj)2]1−βi
The optimal value of λi as function of the incentive rates is
λi =
(1− βi)(1− ai − aj)
1 + 2ai − aj (12)
Furthermore,
∂Bi
∂ai
T 0⇔ −4(2λi + 1)ai + 4(1− λi) + (−4 + 3βi + 4λi)aj − 3βi T 0
Substituting λi from (12) we get
∂Bi
∂ai
T 0⇔ ai S (1− aj)/4 (13)
Hence at the solution we have a1 = a2 = 1/5.
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We will reach the same solution if we derive the incentive rate by maximizing pii(a)
w.r.t. ai, i = 1, 2:
∂pii(a)
∂ai
T 0⇔ −4ai + 1− aj T 0
i.e., iff ai S (1− aj)/4, as in (13).
2. Consider a market where firms produce differentiated goods and compete in prices. The
demand of firm i is qi = α− pi + pj/2. Firms produce with 0 cost. The manager of firm i
is assigned the objective function vi = pii + aiqi. His compensation again is yi = λivi; his
utility and reservation utility are wi(yi) = yi and 0. Again, bargaining is simultaneous and
so is price competition.
We have pii(a) =
2
225
(10 + 7ai − 2aj)(5α− 4ai − aj)); vi(a) = 1
225
(10 + 7ai − 2aj)2.
Hence the Nash product is
Bi = 1
225
[(10α+7ai−2aj)[10α(1+λi)+ai(8+7λi)+aj(2−λi)]]βi [λi(10α+7ai−2aj)2]1−βi
The optimal value of λi is
λi =
2(1− βi)(5α− 4ai − aj)
10α + 7ai − 2aj (14)
Furthermore,
∂Bi
∂ai
T 0⇔ −(69λ1 + 56)ai + (70− 75βi − 70λi)α + (15βi − 14)aj T 0
Substituting λi from (14), we get that
∂Bi
∂ai
T 0⇔ ai S −5α/56 + aj/56 (15)
Hence at the optimum, a1 = a2 = 0.
We would reach to the same conclusion if we had instead maximized directly pii(a) w.r.t.
ai:
∂pii(a)
∂ai
T 0⇔ −10α + 2aj − 112ai T 0
or iff ai S −5α/56 + aj/56, i.e., as in (15).
4 Conclusions
In this note we revisited the model of bargaining over managerial contracts in oligopoly.
We showed that whenever firms and managers negotiate over all terms of the contracts,
the incentive rate of each manager is equal to the rate that he would be offered in a market
without bargaining. As a result, equilibrium market prices, quantities and profits under our
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bargaining framework are identical to those under no bargaining. This is in sharp contrast
with the conclusions of recent works which are based on the assumption that bargaining
involves only a subset of the contractual terms, hence showing that bargaining crucially
affects market outcomes.
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